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INTRODUCTION 
For the first time on appeal, the State finally concedes 
that the time of each alleged offense was when appellant took the 
investor's money and not when it was expended. See "Brief of 
Respondent", at 20, 28 n. 13. As a result, it also now concedes 
for the first time on appeal, as it mustf that only two of the 
eight counts (Counts 1 and 6) were filed within the original four 
year statute of limitations time period. See "Brief of 
Respondent", at 21, 29. 
In light of these necessary concessions, the government 
attempts to salvage the remaining six counts upon which appellant 
was improperly convicted by arguing that prosecution for those 
counts was commenced within the extended time period provided, 
under certain circumstances, by Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-303. 
Unless prosecution was permitted under section 303, the prejudice 
to appellant from being charged with, and required to defend, 
charges, 75% of which were barred by the statute of limitations, 
While the information which added count 6 was timely as to that 
count, it was filed improperly. Under Rule 4(d), U. R. Crim. P., 
an information may be amended only if: (a) it is done with leave 
of court; (b) no additional or different offense is charged; and 
(c) the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. 
The first amended information which added counts 4-6 was filed 
without leave of court, added new offenses and substantially 
prejudiced appellant — all in direct violation of Rule 4(d). 
Because of the clear prejudicial effect to appellant of 
prosecuting him on at least six counts barred by the statute of 
limitations, this Court need not reach the more complex question 
of the effect, if any, to be given to improperly filed 
informations upon subsequently amended informations. 
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was insurmountable. As demonstrated below, the extended time 
provisions of section 303 have absolutely no application to this 
case. The government charged and prosecuted appellant at trial 
on an embezzlement theory in order to gain a distinct and 
deliberate strategic advantage in a multiple-count prosecution. 
Because such a prosecution was erroneous, appellant was unfairly 
prejudiced and his convictions on all counts must be reversed. 
I. SECTION 303 DOES NOT APPLY. 
2 
The evidence in this case was largely undisputed. 
Virtually the only question to be resolved was appellant's intent 
at the time he received the buyers' monies. Indeed, the case was 
so close that it prompted the trial judge to note that he "may 
have voted differently than the juryf if [sic] on the jury. I'll 
say that". See S. Tr. at 10. At the outset, it is important to 
emphasize that the State's theoretical application of section 303 
was never argued or raised below. Further, there is no evidence 
to support its application andf in fact, all of the evidence in 
With unfortunate overzealousness, the government insists in its 
brief in suggesting that appellant concedes he committed a 
criminal offense, but only quarrels with the technical timing of 
such an offense. Appellant's factual narative in his brief was 
drafted in the light most favorable to the government, as 
required by the appropriate standard of appellate review. 
Appellant has notf and does not, admit that he was guilty of any 
offense. To the contrary, he has steadfastly maintained his 
innocence. Nevertheless, appellant recognized, as does this 
Court, that the Court must review the facts in favor of the 
government on appeal. 
3 
"S. Tr." refers to the separate volume of transcript containing 
the sentencing hearing. The transcript reference is also 
paginated as page 1126 of the complete appellate record. 
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the record requires rejection of its invocation. Section 303 
provides in relevant part: 
If the period prescribed in Subsection 76-1-302(1) has 
expiredf a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced 
for: 
(a) Any offense a material element of which is 
either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation 
within one year after discovery of the offense by 
an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal 
duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is 
himself not a party to the offensef but in no case 
shall this provision extend the period of 
limitation otherwise applicable by more than three 
years; • • . 
The plain reading of section 303 provides that criminal 
charges involving fraud must be filed either within four years 
from the date of commission or within one year after discovery of 
the offense whichever is longer. Contrary to the government's 
suggestion section 303 does not extend the period of limitations 
an extra year beyond the otherwise applicable time period, 
particularly if the date of discovery plus one year is less than 
four years from the date of the offense. For example, if a 
fraudulent offense is committed on January lf 1986, the four-year 
statute of limitations runs until January lf 1990. If the 
offense is discovered on January lf 1987f the State would have 
either until January lf 1988 f (one year after the date of 
discovery) or until January lf 1990, (four years from the date of 
commission) whichever is longer. It would not haver as the State 
apparently contends, an additional year tacked onto the four-year 
period to January lf 1991. Finally, in this hypothetical 
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example, if there was no discovery within the normal four-year 
period, the State would have one year from the date of discovery, 
up to a maximum of seven years from the date of offense 
commission, to file charges. 
In a last-ditch effort to correct its fatal charging error, 
the government claims that "ttlhere is no evidence that an 
offense had been discovered by an aggrieved party or 
representative of an aggrieved party" prior to late September or 
early October 1983 - a few days before the first information was 
filed. See "Brief of Respondent"f at 31. The government's 
rhetoric ignores its own citation to the record. It is clear 
that as early as February 1981, the investors knew that appellant 
had -spent their money and also knew the property had not been 
paid for. See "Brief of Respondent"
 f at 8. In factf the 
investors met with appellant on May 13, 1981, and filed a civil 
suit against him in August 1981, more than two years before the 
government attempts to claim they discovered the alleged offense. 
See "Brief of Respondent", at 8. In short, the record is clear 
that the alleged offense was discovered in early 1981 more than 
one year before the four-year statute of limitations would 
otherwise expire in 1983. Accordingly, section 303 has no 
4 
application whatsoever. 
As already illustrated, there is no support for application of 
section 303 to the instant case. Nevertheless, the government 
recognizes that appellant was convicted of offenses which did not 
require a finding of fraud. It contends, however, that the State 
-Continued-
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II. APPELLANT WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICED BY THE MULTIPLE UNTIMELY 
COUNTS. 
Having failed to carry its burden of proof on the statute of 
limitations, the government maintains that it could have 
introduced all of the evidence for those other offenses anyway 
and, thereforef appellant was not prejudiced. It, of course, 
strains the government's credibility to suggest that after 
multiple amendments to the information to gain a strategic and 
significant advantage by charging appellant with multiple 
offenses to defend against at trial, that it did so gratuitously 
since it could have introduced all of the evidence anyway. 
Even with all of the improper charges, this was a close case 
with essentially only one issue, i.e., appellant's intent, for 
the jury to decide. Most importantly, the government recognized 
before the trial court and in its brief on appeal that the 
testimony of investors not charged as victims must be limited "to 
avoid prejudice to the defendant of evidence of other crimes not 
-Continued-
may overcharge someone with an offense having a long statute of 
limitations but convict him of a different offense for which a 
shorter statute would have otherwise run. See "Brief of 
Respondent", at 33. Understandably, the State is unable to 
muster a single authority for its incredible position. This 
comes as no surprise since this Court over forty years ago 
reiterated the well-settled rule that the offense for which an 
individual is convicted must have been commenced within its 
appropriate statute of limitations. See State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 
178, 193-194 (1943) (defendant originally charged only with 
murder for which there was no statute of limitations may not be 
convicted of manslaughter where prosecution was commenced more 
than four years after commission of the offense, i.e., beyond the 
manslaughter limitations period). 
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charged in the information", as required by this Court in State 
yt Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1982). See "Brief of 
Respondent", at 12, n. 6 (investors not charged as victims in the 
information may not testify regarding the financial impact of 
their investments). Yet, in order to circumvent this Court's 
decision in Forsyth, the government made a deliberate decision to 
overcharge appellant on a theory that it now concedes was 
erroneous. This resulted in the prejudicial and inadmissible 
testimony of witnesses that should not have been charged as 
victims in the information and whose testimony, at a minimum, 
5 
should have been greatly streamlined, as required by this Court. 
Appellant's prejudice was much more aggrevated than in 
Forsyth since, in his case, the witnesses were named as victims 
in the information. Compounding the prejudice to appellant by 
the testimony of these improperly charged investors was the 
additional testimony of other investors piled on by the 
government that, pursuant to court order, had their testimony 
« 
somewhat streamlined. The overwhelming effect of being required 
to defend against eleven offenses, when, at most, only two were 
arguably proper, is so fundamentally prejudicial as to compel 
reversal of appellant's convictions on all counts. 
The testimony of the individuals named as victims in those six 
counts for which the statute had clearly run all testified about 
their precuniary loss in violation of this restriction. See Tr. 
at 47, 121, 143, 162 and 178. This testimony was clearly 
inadmissible because of its prejudicial impact under this Court's 
ruling in State v. Forsyth, supra. 
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After Forsyth, this Court has stressed that the admissiblity 
of evidence of other crimes is "severely restricted". State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (1985) (conviction reversed). 
Because of the tendency of the jury to convict upon hearing such 
evidence, it is "presumed prejudicial", JJ. , and must be used 
with "extreme caution". See State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583, 584 
(1984) (conviction reversed). In appellantfs case, a jury heard 
evidence of eleven potential offenses, over 80% of which were 
either erroneously charged, but barred by the statute of 
limitations, or not charged. It could not possibly be expected 
to reach a fair and impartial verdict with regard to the two 
other counts. To argue otherwise, as the government does, 
requires mental gymnastics by a jury and ignores the "generally 
recognized danger that jurors hearing evidence of a defendant's 
commission of another crime will be unduly prejudiced against 
him". See State v. Holder, supra, 694 P.2d at 585. With a 
person's liberty at stake in this close case, the convictions 
must be reversed. 
In view of the government's clear error, as established above, 
it is not necessary to expose the error of its other arguments in 
great detail. Nonetheless, the smoke screen it raises on several 
issues is troublesome. For example, its boiler plate recitation 
of the scope of the consolidated theft statute is not, and never 
has been, at issue. Appellant is not challenging the 
government's academic ability to prove theft by a variety of 
means. Appellant's point in his brief, however, was that 
whatever means is proven must be established by the government to 
have been timely commenced. See "Brief of Appellant", at 18, n. 
14. Similarly, the government's decision to charge appellant 
with a range of dates in each information makes it impossible to 
determine what date, if any, a unanimous jury found appellant may 
have committed any particular offense. Section 303, as already 
noted, is of no help to the government in this regard. 
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III. A HEARING IS NECESSARY REGARDING PROPRIETY AND SCOPE OF 
RESTITUTION AND A MONETARY FINE. 
Appellant clearly advised the Court without contradiction 
that he did not presently have the ability to repay a single 
investor (S. Tr. 6-7). Moreover/ the record is clear that as a 
result of the lawsuits involving appellant's real estate project 
he was forced into involuntary bankruptcy. See "Brief of 
Appellant", at 8f n. 6. Once againf the State concedes that "the 
trial court admittedly failed to state the reasons for ordering 
restitution as part of its written order", as required by law. 
See Utah Code Annotated/ §76-3-201(a) (Supp. 1984). It contends/ 
however/ that such omission was harmless. See "Brief of 
Respondent"/ at 22. 
Rather than speculate/ as the State does, this Court should 
not extrapolate appellant's old net worth statements to the time 
of his sentencing to substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court. It should remand for a full hearing and require the 
trial court to make its reasons/ if anyf part of the record so 
this Court can conduct a meaningful review. Indeed/ in State v. 
Slayer/ 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985)f this Court stressed that "we 
draw attention to this requirement [requiring written reasons] 
for future guidance of the sentencing courts". J^ d. at 614. 
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Although the government recognizes the trial court's 
sentencing order required restitution "to the individuals who 
invested money in the Temple Hills Condominium project"f it 
argues that the trial court obviously contemplated only 
appropriate victims would be entitled to restitution under Utah 
Code Annotated, §76-3-201(3) (Supp. 1984). On appealf the 
government attempts to redraft the trial court's sentencing order 
but in doing so lists so-called victims of offenses including 
those for which the statute of limitations had already run. 
The government's approach effectively calls for this Court 
to resentence appellant. It should be rejected. Appellant 
should be afforded a fair opportunity/ as required/ to a hearing 
before the trial court. At such hearing/ the court should make 
its reasons/ if anyf for ordering restitution clear. It should 
also specifically delineate the amount of any proposed 
restitution and those persons to whom appellant is required to 
make restitution. Appellant should not be forced to risk 
contempt and possible imprisonment in order to contest the trial 
court's errors in the sentencing process. 
Obviously/ the substantial size of the trial court's order of 
restitution indicates it placed significant weight on the number 
of victims improperly charged. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in appellant's original brief, this 
reply brief and to be further articulated at oral argumentf 
appellant respectfully submits that his convictions should be 
reversed, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of Octoberf 1986. 
CLYDE & PRATT 
Rodney G. Snow 
Neil A. Kaplan 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
Appellant's Reply Brief were hand-delivered this 2nd day of 
October, 1986, to the Utah Attorney General's Office at 236 State 
Capitol Buildingf Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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